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pleader was allowed although claims did not arise from the same con-
tract. Boyle v. Manion, 74 Miss. 572, 21 So. 530 (1896). This entire
topic is treated in the excellent article by Professor Chafee, supra. in
which he concluded that the matter of claiming the same debt should
be treated more liberally.
One might argue that statutory interpleader "in action upon con-
tract, or for recovery of personal property," is to be used only in law
actions, since actions for money due, or damages for the breach of con-
tract and for replevin, were law actions. Bridge v. Martin, 2 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 410 (i86o). Therefore the narrow common law interpleader
should govern the requirements of the statutory interpleader, since its
jurisdiction is a purely statutory one. But assuming that it was intended
to apply only to law actions, it should not be restricted in its application
by the old common law requirements. It is doubtful whether the Legis-
lature intended to require the common law essentials. The case of
Boyle v. Manion, supra, expresses a preferable view. The court said
that the intention of the Legislature was to enlarge the scope of inter-
pleader and have the rights of the parties adjudicated on the basis of
the merits of the case. In the Ohio Statute of the eight requirements of
equitable interpleader, four are in some manner mentioned. Did the
Legislature intend that the other four be included? The Ohio courts
have included them. It seems reasonable that if all eight "requirements"
were intended to be necessary, the Legislature would have so stated,
instead of mentioning only certain ones.
Because of the limited facts given in the principal case, one cannot
determine whether the applicant was responsible for his own precarious
position. He might possibly have created contractual liability to two
parties, knowing full well the results of his acts. This factor by itself
would be sufficient basis for denying any relief of interpleader.
SAM TOPOLOSKY
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
SET-OFF AS A DEFENSE UNDER THE N. I. L.
The plaintiff executed a note and mortgage to a bank. After
maturity the bank indorsed and assigned the note and mortgage to the
defendant insurance company. At the time of the transfer the plaintiff
had on deposit in the bank a larger sum than the balance then due upon
the note. No notice of the transfer was given to the plaintiff until after
the bank had closed its doors. The plaintiff prayed that his deposit be
set-off against the note and mortgage. The defendant insurance com-
pany filed an answer and cross-petitioned that, if a set-off were allowed
to the plaintiff, then the Superintendent of Banks should hold an equiv-
alent amount in trust for the insurance company. The Superintendent
of Banks answered that the note and mortgage were indorsed, assigned,
and transferred by the bank to the insurance company after maturity
and without recourse. Held, "upon payment by the plaintiff to the
insurance company of a sum equalling the amount of dividends received
by the plaintiff, proportioned to the relation of the set-off and entire
account of the plaintiff, the note and mortgage will be cancelled and
surrendered to the plaintiff." Smith v. Fulton, Supt. of Banks, 51 Ohio
App. 12, 4 Ohio Op. 291, Ohio Bar, Dec. 30, 1935.
It would seem that Section I1321, General Code, is determinative
of this case. It provides: "When cross demands have existed between
persons under such circumstances that if one had brought an action
against the other a counterclaim or set-off could have been set up,
neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by assignment by the other,
or by his death. The two demands must be deemed compensated so far
as they equal each other." A negotiable instrument after maturity is a
demand within the meaning of the statute, and thus the maker of a note
cannot be deprived of the benefit of a set-off against the payee by an
assignment after maturity.
Although the court cited this section, it also relied on Section S163,
General Code (Section 58 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law): "In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course,
a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-
negotiable. . . . " Indeed, paragraph 3 of the syllabus reads: "The
term defenses as used in Section 8163, General Code, prescribing the
defenses to which a negotiable instrument is subject in the hands of a
holder other than in due course, includes set-off." The court points out
that a set-off was allowed under similar circumstances before the adop-
tion of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Baker v. Kinsey, 41 Ohio St.
403 (1884): that the term "defenses" in a statute similar to Section
8163 was construed as including set-off. Follett, Idnz'r v. Buyer, 4
Ohio St. 587 (I855); and that the courts of this country are about
equally divided for and against the allowance of set-offs in such cases.
70 A.L.R. 248.
On the other hand, most text writers have insisted that a set-off is
not a defense within the meaning of Section 58. Chitty, Bills x3 th Am.
ed. 251, 3 Daniell Negotiable Instruments 7 th ed. Section 1693, p.
1745. " . . . set-offs are in no sense 'defenses' to a negotiable (or
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non-negotiable) instrument. They do not constitute 'defects of title'
nor 'infirmities' in the instrument, nor do they in any wise discredit the
paper." Bigelow, Bills, Notes, and Checks, 3rd ed. p. 445- Under the
law merchant the indorsee after maturity of a negotiable instrument took
it subject only to equities attaching to or inherent in the instrument
itself at the time of the transfer and equities arising out of the instru-
ment which exist at the time of the transfer. Pusey & Jones Co. v.
Hansen, 279 Fed. 488 (C.C.A., 3rd C., 1922), reversed on other
grounds, 261 U.S. 491, 67 L.E. 763, 43 S. Ct. 454 (1922). Worden
v. Gillett, 275 Fed. 654 (D.C., S.D. Fla. 1921). The opinion in
Stegal v. Union Bank, 163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438 (I934) contains
an exhaustive discussion of the problem before and after the passage of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. The conclusion reached in that case
is that it could not have been the intention of the drafters of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law that defenses "should mean technical defenses
and offsets in one state, and technical defenses, but not offsets in an-
other," supra, p. 459. But it is probable that that is just what the
drafters did intend. When the Negotiable Instruments Law was sub-
mitted to the legislatures of the several states, the following note was
appended to section 58: "It is not deemed expedient to make provision
as to what equities the transferee will be subject to; for the matter may
be affected by the statutes of the various states relating to set-off and
counterclaim. On the question whether such equities may be asserted as
attach to the bill, or whether equities arising out of collateral matters
may also be asserted, the decisions are conflicting. In an act designed
to be uniform in the various states, no more can be done than fix the
rights of the holders in due course." Stegal v. Union Bank, supra,
P. 453. Evidently it was not thought important that the law as regards
holders not in due course should be uniform. Apart from the question
of the meaning of "defense" in section 58, it seems that the decision in
this case is correct and that the law as it stands does substantial justice.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE
PROBATE PRACTICE
RIGHT OF JURY TO Fix THE TIME OF DEATH WHERE A PRE-
SUMPTION ARISES FROM SEVEN YEARS' UNEXPLAINED AB-
SENCE - POWER OF PROBATE COURT TO APPOINT AN
ADMINISTRATOR IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE
John V. Phillips, an insurance agent, worked his regular territory
in Columbus on June 27, 1922, and was last seen that evening on the
street car which ordinarily took him to his home. Four days later, an
